Ontic Explanation Is either Ontic or Explanatory, but Not Both

Abstract

This paper advances three related arguments showing that the ontic conception of explanation (OC), which is often adverted to in the mechanistic literature, is inferentially and conceptually incapacitated, and in ways that square poorly with scientific practice.Firstly, the main argument that would speak in favor of OC is invalid, and faces several objections.Secondly, OC's superimposition of ontic explanation and singular causation leaves it unable to accommodate scientifically important explanations.Finally, attempts to salvage OC by reframing it in terms of 'ontic constraints' just concedes the debate to the epistemic conception of explanation.Together, these arguments indicate that the epistemic conception is more or less the only game in town.

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