SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Why Do Desires Rationalize Actions?
16 references·0 citing·29 second hop
Why Do Desires Rationalize Actions? (2019)Why Do Desires Rationalize Actions?The Normativity of Rationality (2017)The Normativity of RationalityRationality Through Reasoning (2013)Rationality Through ReasoningAristotle on the Apparent Good (2012)Aristotle on the Apparent GoodReasons without rationalism (2007)Reasons without rationalismValue, Reality, and Desire (2005)Value, Reality, and DesireProblems of Rationality (2004)Problems of RationalityAuthority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge (2003)Authority and Estrangement: A…How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? (2001)How Is Weakness of the Will P…What We Owe to Each Other (2000)What We Owe to Each OtherReasons and motivation (1997)Reasons and motivationMind and World (1994)Mind and WorldThe Intentional Stance (1987)The Intentional StanceThe Humean Theory of Motivation (1987)The Humean Theory of Motivati…The Authority of Desire (1987)The Authority of DesireDesiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology (1979)Desiring the Bad: An Essay in…Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? (1978)Are Moral Requirements Hypoth…Opting for the Best (2019)Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure (2019)Inquiry and the epistemic (2021)A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism (1998)Moral Realism (2003)Representation in Cognitive Science (2018)Social Theory of International Politics (1999)Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. (2003)On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. (2007)The cognitive functions of language (2002)The Transparency of Experience (2002)Doing without Concepts (2009)Responsibility for believing (2006)Wandering in Darkness (2010)Games (2020)Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy (2001)A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value (2005)Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020)The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions (2000)Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life (2005)On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit (2014)Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning (2015)The Importance of Being Rational (2018)What is inference? (2012)Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions (2013)The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence (2015)Motivation and Agency (2003)A Theory of Virtue (2006)The Nature of Normativity (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1987The Intentional Stance4,268 cited
  • 2000What We Owe to Each Other3,491 cited
  • 1994Mind and World1,826 cited
  • 2013Rationality Through Reasoning1,552 cited
  • 2003Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge1,065 cited
  • 1987The Humean Theory of Motivation1,005 cited
  • 1978Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?924 cited
  • 2017The Normativity of Rationality724 cited
  • 1979Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology680 cited
  • 2007Reasons without rationalism540 cited
  • 1987The Authority of Desire466 cited
  • 1997Reasons and motivation423 cited
  • 2005Value, Reality, and Desire415 cited
  • 2004Problems of Rationality415 cited
  • 2012Aristotle on the Apparent Good387 cited
  • 2001How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?374 cited

Cited by

No citing works inside the corpus for this window.

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work