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Swap Bribery
6 references·3 citing·29 second hop
Swap Bribery (2009)Swap BriberyLlull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control (2009)Llull and Copeland Voting Com…Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem (2008)Algorithms for the coalitiona…When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? (2007)When are elections with few c…Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation (2007)Uncertainty in preference eli…Voting procedures with incomplete preferences (2005)Voting procedures with incomp…The computational difficulty of manipulating an election (1989)The computational difficulty …The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates (2013)The complexity of manipulativ…Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Swap Bribery (2011)Multivariate Complexity Analy…Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules (2010)Towards a dichotomy for the P…On the Rationale of Group Decision-making (1948)Single transferable vote resists strategic voting (1991)Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries (2009)Campaigns for lazy voters: Truncated ballots (2012)Chapter 4 Voting procedures (2002)The complexity of Kemeny elections (2005)Computational Social Choice (2012)Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting (2015)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1997)How Hard Is Bribery in Elections? (2009)AI's War on Manipulation: Are We Winning? (2010)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Social Choice and Individual Values (1952)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates (2015)Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election (1989)How hard is it to control an election? (1992)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Incentives in Teams (1973)Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections (2008)Multimode Control Attacks on Elections (2011)Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules (2012)A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice (2007)Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information (2011)Barriers to Manipulation in Voting (2016)On the computation of fully proportional representation (2013)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1989The computational difficulty of manipulating an election530 cited
  • 2007When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?348 cited
  • 2009Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control242 cited
  • 2005Voting procedures with incomplete preferences165 cited
  • 2007Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation139 cited
  • 2008Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem126 cited

Cited by

  • 2010Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules87 cited
  • 2013The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates82 cited
  • 2011Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Swap Bribery81 cited

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