Investigating Unethical Decisions at Work: Justification and Emotion in Dilemma Resolution

Abstract

Although philosophers have been discussing normative models of ethical decision making for hundreds of years, descriptive models of the process emerged only in the last half-century (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Rest, 1986). In examining how individuals actually make choices when facing ethical dilemmas, researchers have begun to identify some of the factors shaping ethical and unethical choices. Although several theoretical models of the ethical decision-making process have been advanced (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Jones, 1991; Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1986; Trevino, 1986), most empirical work on ethical decision making in business centers either on Jones' (1991) issue-contingent model, which argues that the moral intensity of an issue is most important (see also Carlson et al., 2002), or Trevino's (1986) interactionist model, which examines the interplay of individual and contextual factors on ethical decisions. Though each of the two models has received some empirical support (Franke et al., 1997; Loe et al., 2000; Paolillo and Vitell, 2002), neither is strongly grounded in the decisionmaking literature (e.g. Ritov and Baron, 1999; Tanner and Medin, 2004). Perhaps more importantly, neither model addresses the role of emotions, which empirical studies in various realms have shown to be an important part of the decision process (Baron, 1992; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Mellers and McGraw, 2001; Morris and Feldman, 1997; Morrow et al., 2004; Slovic et al., 2002). Finally, the two models speak only generally of the justifications cited by individuals, with Jones (1991) focusing on consequence-based explanations and Trevino (1986) addressing cultural and personal reasons for choosing a particular alternative. Justifications are emerging as an important factor in connecting anticipated emotions such as regret to decision-making processes (e.g., Connolly and Zeelenberg, 2002). The present study attempts to connect research on business ethics more closely to decision research in general by examining the effects of two kinds of factors--justifications and emotions--on the ethical decisionmaking processes of individuals. Each category of factors has been explored by decision researchers in recent years, though primarily not in the realm of ethical decision making (Connolly and Zeelenberg, 2002; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Using hypothetical decision situations, we examine the influence of each kind of factor on the choices made by individuals facing ethical dilemmas. Before describing the study in detail, we survey some of the main theoretical approaches that have been proposed. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND Ethical decisions often involve a variety of emotions (Gaudine and Thorne, 2001; Klein, 2002), both those experienced in the making of the decision and those anticipated (and perhaps experienced) as a result of the decision. As noted, researchers in the field of judgment and decision making have recently devoted increased attention to the role that emotions play in shaping individuals' choices (Gilbert and Wilson, 2000; Mellers et al., 1999). Researchers have noted both beneficial and detrimental effects of real and anticipated emotions on decision makers (Brief and Weiss, 2002; Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999). Among the most important findings are those linking expected emotions to choice (e.g., Mellers and McGraw, 2001; Mellers et al., 1999). Perhaps no emotion has received more attention than regret, ... a negative, cognitively based emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better had we acted differently (Zeelenberg, 1999: 325). The effect of anticipated and experienced regret on choice is now well established. Examples in consumer choice include Inman, Dyer and Jia (1997), Simonson (1992), and Tsiros and Mittal (2000). Also, Connolly and Reb (2003) and Pieters and Zeelenberg (2005) give examples of the role of regret and justification in a variety of other personal, medical and financial decisions. …

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