German Judicial Self-Government — Institutions and Constraints

Abstract

Abstract Typically, Germany is portrayed as apersistent objectorto Judicial Self-Government in any form. The present paper will demonstrate that this position is untenable: Actually, the German judiciary disposes of a differentiated system of institutions of self-government. The effects of these institutional settings on core values like independence and accountability proves to be mixed at best, however. Furthermore, there are practically no proponents of a stronger version of self-government to be reckoned with. Indeed, the Italian-style model of self-government or the visions of the CCJE are basically contrary to the prevailing German understanding of democratic legitimacy and separation of powers; moreover, the long lasting recruiting pattern of the German judiciary will act as a powerful obstacle. Ultimately, even the introduction of a strong self-government via constitutional amendment remains an open question.

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