SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Disagreement as Interpersonal Incoherence
16 references·1 citing·41 second hop
Disagreement as Interpersonal Incoherence (2019)Disagreement as Interpersonal IncoherenceMoral Disagreement and Moral Semantics (2016)Moral Disagreement and Moral …Why Suspend Judging? (2015)Why Suspend Judging?Intention as a Model for Belief 1 (2014)Intention as a Model for Beli…Confusion of Tongues (2014)Confusion of TonguesAssessment Sensitivity (2014)Assessment SensitivityRational Probabilistic Incoherence (2013)Rational Probabilistic Incohe…Doxastic Disagreement (2013)Doxastic DisagreementSuspended judgment (2011)Suspended judgmentDisputing about Taste (2010)Disputing about TasteDisagreements about taste (2010)Disagreements about tasteRelativism and Monadic Truth (2009)Relativism and Monadic TruthCause and Norm (2009)Cause and NormWhy Be Disposed to Be Coherent? (2008)Why Be Disposed to Be Coheren…Indexical telativism versus genuine relativism (2004)Indexical telativism versus g…A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism (1998)A Nonpragmatic Vindication of…Ethics and Language (1944)Ethics and LanguageReality and Morality (2020)Reality and MoralityCausation as Influence (2000)Causation and Counterfactuals (2004)Making Things Happen (2004)Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions (2010)Graded Causation and Defaults (2014)Normality: Part descriptive, part prescriptive (2016)A Natural History of Negation (1989)A Natural history of negation (1990)Projecting the Adjective: The Syntax and Semantics of Gradability and Comparison (1999)Conceptual Ethics II (2013)Taste predicates and the acquaintance inference (2015)Backtracking Counterfactuals Revisited (2016)The Humean Theory of Motivation (1987)Betting on Theories (1993)The Possibility of Practical Reason (1996)Putting Logic in its Place (2004)BELIEF IS CREDENCE ONE (IN CONTEXT) (2013)Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (2016)The psychology of curiosity: A review and reinterpretation. (1994)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Inquiry and Belief (2017)A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief (2018)Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment (2020)The Aim Of Belief (2002)Philosophical Perspectives (2003)Evidentialism (2004)Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities* (2015)UNCERTAINTY AND THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE (1978)Uncertainty and The Welfare Economics of Medical Care (2001)Pragmatics and Non-Verbal Communication (2009)Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy (2017)Transparency and Self-Knowledge (2018)The relationship between belief and credence (2020)Normative reasons as good bases (2015)The Meaning of ‘Ought’: Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics (2016)Mere formalities: fictional normativity and normative authority (2018)Problems with Norms of Assertion (2015)Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy (2015)IX—Moral Encroachment (2018)The moving spotlight theory (2014)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1998A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism774 cited
  • 2014Assessment Sensitivity683 cited
  • 1944Ethics and Language636 cited
  • 2009Relativism and Monadic Truth430 cited
  • 2009Cause and Norm371 cited
  • 2015Why Suspend Judging?303 cited
  • 2011Suspended judgment266 cited
  • 2014Confusion of Tongues223 cited
  • 2010Disagreements about taste192 cited
  • 2014Intention as a Model for Belief 1164 cited
  • 2010Disputing about Taste155 cited
  • 2008Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?152 cited
  • 2013Rational Probabilistic Incoherence112 cited
  • 2004Indexical telativism versus genuine relativism105 cited
  • 2016Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics82 cited
  • 2013Doxastic Disagreement70 cited

Cited by

  • 2020Reality and Morality37 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work