Games borrower governments play: the implementation of economic adjustment programmes in Cyprus and Portugal

Abstract

Research on the Economic Adjustment Programmes (EAPs) for Eurozone crisis countries has so far acknowledged the role of creditor countries and Troika institutions or has examined the economic effects or structural determinants of domestic implementation processes. The role of borrower governments as strategic actors within the ‘Troika complex’ has been neglected. Taking Cyprus and Portugal as cases in point, the article shows how reform-oriented borrower governments used the interaction with the Troika to overcome veto player opposition to programme implementation. Drawing on the two-level game and on negotiation theory, the study discusses borrower strategies in response to opposition from the court or parliament, and the costs of no agreement. Reform-oriented governments mostly used commitments to the international level or Troika pressure to pursue coercive strategies vis-à-vis domestic opponents. High costs of no agreement seem to be a necessary means to pass on political and market pressure through coercion.

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