Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics

Abstract

Abstract Evolutionary debunking arguments abound, but it is widely assumed that they do not arise for our perceptual beliefs about midsized objects, insofar as the adaptive value of our object beliefs cannot be explained without reference to the objects themselves. This chapter argues that this is a mistake. Just as with moral beliefs, the adaptive value of our object beliefs can be explained without assuming that the beliefs are accurate. The chapter then explores the prospects for another sort of vindication of our object beliefs—which involves “bootstrapping” from our experiences of midsized objects—and defends bootstrapping maneuvers against a variety of objections. Finally, an explanatory constraint on bootstrapping is articulated and defended, and a variety of attempts to respond to debunking arguments are shown to run afoul of the constraint.

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