The Relation Between Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology

Abstract

This chapter argues that virtue epistemology is a branch of virtue ethics. It also argues that virtue ethics should be seen as a very broad field not restricted to what has traditionally been described as the rather narrow field of the "moral”. An understanding of the nature of virtue ethics and the relation between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology is bedeviled by the notion of the moral. Virtue ethics is the sphere of virtue proper where at the heart of virtue proper is practical wisdom—a wisdom that integrates all relevant spheres of the practical. A virtue proper is an excellence of character, in which excellences in relevant practical domains have been integrated. One major task is a virtue ethical conception of the relation between the ethics of roles and "ordinary morality", where practical wisdom has to be supplemented by relevant expertise, and constrained by institutional rules and protocols.

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