The effects of prior co‐investments on the performance of venture capitalist syndicates: A relational agency perspective

Abstract

Abstract Research Summary This study provides a reconciliation of previous findings regarding the effects of prior co‐investments among venture capitalists (VCs) and the performance of VC syndicates. We propose a relational agency framework outlining cost–benefit trade‐offs associated with prior co‐investments between VCs. A longitudinal study of 4,550 U.S. ventures receiving syndicated investments from 1980 to 2017 shows that there exists an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the number of prior co‐investments and a venture's likelihood of a successful exit through initial public offering or merger and acquisition. We further find that the relationship between prior co‐investments and syndicate performance is moderated by venture‐ and partner‐specific risks. Managerial Summary We study the effects of prior co‐investments among venture capital (VC) firms on the performance of VC syndicates. We propose a framework outlining cost–benefit trade‐offs associated with prior co‐investments between VCs. A study of 4,550 U.S. ventures receiving syndicated investments shows that there exists an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the number of prior co‐investments and a venture's likelihood of a successful exit through initial public offering or merger and acquisition. Our findings hold implications for managers considering whom to partner with for future co‐investments and the conditions under which prior co‐investments are more or less likely to be beneficial.

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