Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap

Qiqi Yan

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

For revenue and welfare maximization in single-dimensional Bayesian settings, Chawla et al. (STOC10) recently showed that sequential posted-price mechanisms (SPMs), though simple in form, can perform surprisingly well compared to the optimal mechanisms. In this paper, we give a theoretical explanation of this fact, based on a connection to the notion of correlation gap.

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References

1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS 1981Optimal Auction Design 1973Incentives in Teams 1989The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions 2005The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction 2000Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms 2009Simple versus optimal mechanisms 2010Revenue maximization with a single sample

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2014Mechanism Design and Approximation 2017Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers 2012Dynamic pricing with limited supply 2012The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design 2015Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply 2011Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers 2013The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions

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