Revisiting positionality and the thesis of situated knowledge

Abstract

Feminist and queer epistemologies have been influential throughout the social sciences by means of the development of a set of interrelated approaches involving positionality, partiality, reflexivity, intersectionality, and the highly politicized thesis of situated knowledge. This article aims to operationalize these approaches by introducing an anti-humanist, politically attuned, and historically contextualized framework, which postulates that one’s knowledge is inevitably incomplete and situated because information about the world always reaches one through a channel that is constituted by four epistemic gaps: (1) ‘possible worlds versus realized world’, (2) ‘realized world versus witnessed situation’, (3) ‘witnessed situation versus remembered situation’, and (4) ‘remembered situation versus confessed situation’.

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