Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and EvidenceAlex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Dirk Jenter2017-01-01preprintSSRN Electronic Journal189 citationsgreenNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Corporate Finance and GovernanceAuditing, Earnings Management, GovernanceAccounting and Organizational ManagementAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 189 citations exist upstream.References1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm1996Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers1979Moral Hazard and Observability1988Management ownership and market valuation1996Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences1990Performance Pay and Top-Management IncentivesCited by2020Grow the Pie2022Renewable Governance: Good for the Environment?2021The effects of mutual fund decarbonization on stock prices and carbon emissions2017Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶This article was prepared for the Elsevier Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance. We thank the editors, Ben Hermalin and Mike Weisbach, for inviting us to write this chapter. We thank Bo Becker, Amil Dasgupta, Doron Levit, Song Ma, Devin Reilly, Ed Rock, Fenghua Song, David Yermack, and especially Øyvind Bøhren for comments, and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, and Tom Schneider for research assistance.2019Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, Turnover and Firm Valuation2019Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation: A Talent-Retention Explanation2020Product Market Peers and Relative Performance Evaluation2019Agency conflicts and short- versus long-termism in corporate policies