Cross-Domain Deterrence

Abstract

Abstract The complexity of the twenty-first century threat landscape contrasts significantly with the bilateral nuclear bargaining context envisioned by classical deterrence theory. Nuclear and conventional arsenals continue to develop alongside antisatellite programs, autonomous robotics or drones, cyber operations, biotechnology, and other innovations barely imagined in the early nuclear age. The concept of cross-domain deterrence emerged near the end of the George W. Bush administration as policymakers and commanders confronted emerging threats to vital American military systems in space and cyberspace. The Pentagon now recognizes five operational environments or so-called domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), and cross-domain deterrence poses serious problems in practice. This book steps back to assess the theoretical relevance of cross-domain deterrence for the field of international relations. As a general concept, cross-domain deterrence posits that the ways in which actors choose to deter affects the quality of the deterrence they achieve. Contributors to this book include senior and junior scholars and national security practitioners. Their chapters probe the analytical utility of cross-domain deterrence by examining how differences across, and combinations of, different military and nonmilitary instruments can affect choices and outcomes in coercive policy in historical and contemporary cases.

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