SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the VC Dimension
14 references·1 citing·36 second hop
Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the VC Dimension (2015)Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms …The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions (2012)The computational complexity …An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations (2011)An impossibility result for t…Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions (2010)Inapproximability for VCG-bas…On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2009)On the Power of Randomization…On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2009)On the Power of Randomization…On the Hardness of Being Truthful (2008)On the Hardness of Being Trut…Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms (2007)Limitations of VCG-based mech…Algorithmic Game Theory (2007)Algorithmic Game TheoryTruthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (2006)Truthful randomized mechanism…The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (2005)The communication requirement…Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders (2005)Approximation algorithms for …Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions (2003)Incentive compatible multi un…Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions (2003)Bundling equilibrium in combi…Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)Truth revelation in approxima…Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation (2016)Computational Efficiency Requ…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Incentives in Teams (1973)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Item pricing for revenue maximization (2008)Approximate Mechanism Design without Money (2013)Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2001)Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions (2004)Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming (2005)Bayesian Mechanism Design (2013)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2014)Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity (2014)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2005)Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008)Approximate mechanism design without money (2009)Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents (2001)Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions (2013)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design (2005)Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains (2005)Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions (2002)Combinatorial Auctions (2005)An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders (2006)On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive (2006)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Multi-bid auctions for bandwidth allocation in communication networks (2004)Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions (2008)Economic theory of teams (1972)Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)The Use of Knowledge in Society (1996)On optimal single-item auctions (2011)On the Approximability of Budget Feasible Mechanisms (2011)Participatory Budgeting: Models and Approaches (2020)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Society-in-the-loop: programming the algorithmic social contract (2017)Agent-Based Modeling in Economics and Finance: Past, Present, and Future (2025)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2007Algorithmic Game Theory2,416 cited
  • 2002Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions658 cited
  • 2005The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices261 cited
  • 2003Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions193 cited
  • 2006Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions189 cited
  • 2005Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders164 cited
  • 2003Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions146 cited
  • 2008On the Hardness of Being Truthful146 cited
  • 2011An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations88 cited
  • 2012The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions67 cited
  • 2007Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms62 cited
  • 2009On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design58 cited
  • 2009On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design48 cited
  • 2010Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions48 cited

Cited by

  • 2016Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation28 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work