Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad

Brad Hooker

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Ethics in Business and Education Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Abstract

Abstract In this chapter, I focus on the view I think is most often meant by the title ‘moral particularism’. This view is held by some of the most morally admirable people I know. Yet, as I shall explain here, the view seems wrong. I shall also argue that, whether or not it is wrong, the view would be a bad one for society to accept.

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2004The Practice of Liberal Pluralism 2002What if x isn't the number of sheep? Wittgenstein and Thought-Experiments in Ethics 2004Particularism and Default Reasons 2014Sidgwick's Axioms and Consequentialism 2010Challenging Moral Particularism 2019Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life 2005Murdoch, Practical Reasoning, and Particularism 2005The Many Moral Particularisms

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