Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy

Abstract

Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberative democracy. I then propose a version of deliberative democracy that is grounded in non‐veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because it facilitatesempathetic understanding. I claim that empathetic understanding is an epistemic good that doesn't have truth as its primary goal.

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