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This paper analyzes the conditions under which the expectation of being eligible for bonuses in group-based pay-for-performance programs (PFP) can yield enhanced performance in public services. We build three hypotheses and test them on a unique dataset from the Brazilian police forces. We combine the theories of incentives and of expectancy and we demonstrate that the expectation of financial rewards motivates police officers to exert additional effort, thus fostering crime reduction. We also show that incentive distortions and gaming do not occur in the presence of effective monitoring, and when the performance indicators that are not part of the incentive system present interdependencies with the targeted outcomes. We contribute to the evolving literature on pay-for-performance in the context of public services by highlighting the role of expectancy on public service performance and by discussing the mechanisms through which group responses to PFP programs can leverage coordination and improve public performance standards
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