Sidelining corporate human rights violations: The failure of the OECD’s regulatory consensus

Abstract

This article critically assesses the effectiveness of the OECD mechanism for regulating human rights violations by private corporations. It presents a recategorization of the outcomes of OECD cases as a basis for analyzing—both quantitatively and qualitatively—precisely how such cases are resolved in practice. In doing so, the article critically evaluates two key claims made by proponents of the process: first, that the OECD mechanism is capable of encouraging mutually agreed upon, consensual outcomes; and, second, that the process has been enhanced following its 2011 revision. The article concludes by reflecting on the significance of the findings set out herein to the development of a new treaty on business and human rights that is currently under way in the UN Human Rights Council.

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