Promising's Neglected Siblings: Oaths, Vows, and Promissory Obligation

Abstract

Abstract Promises of a customary, interpersonal kind have received no small amount of philosophical attention. Of particular interest has been their capacity to generate moral obligations. This capacity is arguably what distinguishes promises from other, similar phenomena, like communicating a firm intention. But this capacity is common to still other nearby phenomena, such as oaths and vows. These latter phenomena belong to the same family of concepts as promises, but they are structurally and functionally distinct. Taken in their turn, they fill out what I call the ‘breadth criterion’: Theories of promising should cover not only customary, interpersonal promises but also sibling phenomena, including oaths and vows. Accommodating the breadth criterion is not something all theories of promising are positioned to accomplish. I focus on the challenge that the breadth criterion poses for Scanlon's influential expectation view of promising and suggest a normative powers account will fare better.

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