Vulnerability and Autonomy – Children and Adults

Abstract

In liberal ethics, it is generally assumed that adults are autonomous and independent, whereas children are non-autonomous, dependent and vulnerable. It has been pointed out, however, that all persons are vulnerable. This view seems to blur the distinction between childhood and adulthood. In this essay, I discuss whether introducing a notion of universal vulnerability really undermines the common liberal view on childhood and adulthood. My main claim is that this is not the case: even if all persons are vulnerable, children must still be seen as specially vulnerable. I make clear that the attempt to elucidate the special vulnerability of children leads back to a distinction between children and adults that is based on the concepts of autonomy and independence. For the purpose of this argument, I develop a two-level notion of vulnerability. Against this background, I further argue that while the classical distinction between childhood and adulthood should be maintained, there is reason to reconsider what it means to be an adult or a child. I also claim that some forms of vulnerability in children are worth being cultivated.

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