The BRICS and Collective Financial Statecraft

Abstract

In the context of an ongoing global power shift, the largest emerging economies (China, Russia, India, Brazil) formed an exclusive and informal club called the BRIC s. Subsequently joined by South Africa, the BRICS have exercised collective financial statecraft , defined as the use of financial and monetary policies by sovereign governments for the purpose of achieving larger foreign policy goals. This volume identifies four types of such financial statecraft, ranging from pressure for inside reforms of either multilateral institutions or global markets, to outside options exercised through creating new multilateral institutions or jointly pushing for new realities in international financial markets. The joint actions of the BRICS have been largely successful. Although each member has its own unique rationale for collaboration, the largest member, China, controls resources that afford it the greatest influence in intraclub decision-making. The BRICS hang together due to common aversions (resentment over being perennial junior partners in global economic and financial governance, resistance to infringements on their autonomy and dollar dominance) and common interests (obtaining greater voice in international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund). The BRICS are neither revolutionaries nor shirkers. The group seeks reforms, influence, and leadership roles within the existing liberal capitalist global economic order. Where blocked, they experiment with parallel multilateral institutions in which they are the dominant rule-makers. The future of the BRICS depends not only on their bargaining power and adjustment to market players, but also on their ability to overcome domestic impediments to the sustainable economic growth that provides the basis for their international positions.

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