How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view

Thomas Grundmann

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreement—the Total Evidence View (TEV) and the Equal Weight View (EWV)—are both inadequate for substantial reasons. TEV does not issue the correct intuitive verdicts about a number of hypothetical cases of peer disagreement. The same is true for EWV. In addition, EWV does not give any explanation of what is rationally required of agents on the basis of sufficiently general epistemic principles. I will then argue that there is a genuine alternative to both views—the Preemption View (PV)—that fares substantially better in both respects. I will give an outline and a detailed defense of PV in the paper.

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2007Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News 2014Assessment Sensitivity 2007Reflection and Disagreement 2005The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement 2005Epistemic Permissiveness 2012Epistemic Authority 2014Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat 2010Higher‐Order Evidence 1

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