Power, Fairness, and Architecture: Modeling Early Chiefdom Development in the Central Andes

Abstract

This chapter models the development of complex architecture in simple chiefly societies in the Central Andes. We employ a theoretical framework that draws from evolutionary game theory, economic anthropology, evolutionary psychology, and comparative behavioral science. In this theoretical framework, the evolution of culture equates with the evolution of human cooperation in ever-larger groups. As “conditional cooperators,” humans will create complex labor organizations under the appropriate conditions. Taking into account recent research in evolutionary game theory, we demonstrate how these conditions were met for the first time on the Peruvian coast and then spread to the highlands using examples from both the coast and the altiplano.

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