No open-access location is known for this record yet.
No open-access location is known for this record yet.
Abstract We explore the use of voluntary disclosure by managers to solicit market feedback. Using managerial capital expenditure forecasts, we find that managers adjust annual capital expenditures upward (downward) in response to positive (negative) stock market reactions to capital expenditure forecasts, but only for those forecast announcements that stimulate rather than discourage informed trading. These capex adjustments motivated by market feedback correlate with higher future performance and are stronger (weaker) when outsiders (managers) are more informed. Finally, we show that managers are more likely to issue and learn from capex forecasts when predisclosure stock prices are affected by transitory nonfundamental shocks.
Loading…
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 131 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.