Accuracy Conditions, Functions, Perceptual Discrimination

Abstract

I am deeply indebted to Alex Byrne, Jonathan Cohen and Matthew McGrath for their careful, constructive, and penetrating comments on The Unity of Perception and I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify my view further. Byrne’s first set of questions focuses on my central notion of perceptual capacities. He asks why I focus on capacities to discriminate and single out rather than, say, the capacity to know. In response, one reason against focusing on the capacity to know is that one goal of my account is to give an account of perceptual knowledge: it is not clear what explanatory progress would be made if knowledge were analysed in terms of the capacity to know. Such an account seems quite obviously circular. Similarly, it is unclear what explanatory progress would be made if representational content is analysed in terms of capacities to represent.

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