ESSAYS IN BEHAVIORAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS.

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes firms' side problems in economics using an industrial organization approach to provide analysis and policy tools.they consume a good over a period of time, paying for it with a fee due at a later period.Although contracts normally specify that customers are expected to pay the bill on time, and most impose a penalty if the fee is paid late, many customers pay late, despite anecdotal evidence that customers intend to pay on time; which we refer to as preference reversal.In this paper, I find that such behavior, which we characterize as a preference reversal, can be explained by present bias, but only under restrictive parameter conditions.However, allowing for memory shocks (consumers forget a bill is due) helps rationalize such behavior for less restrictive parameter values.I further show how a seller can increase profits by setting fees and penalties that lead consumers to fall prey to preference reversals over time.

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