An Associationist View of Biases in Causal and Probabilistic Judgment

Abstract

Introduction During the last few decades, an important debate has taken place in cognitive psychology concerning the rationality of human reasoning. One field in which this debate has been vigorous is that of inductive inference and probabilistic reasoning or, in more general terms, situations in which people make predictions about uncertain events (Anderson, 1991; Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988; Cohen, 1981; Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996). This research has produced mixed results, ranging from some showing that human predictive behaviour under uncertain conditions is basically rational to others demonstrating violations of various principles of rationality. Equally controversial has been research on the psychological processes involved in this kind of reasoning. The debate has been intense and models have been proposed based on very different mechanisms, from those which involve the application of rules and procedures of a quasi-logical

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 0 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.