Democratic equality and militant democracy

Abstract

The practice of militant democracy reacts to a perceived weakness of democratic political systems: a democracy seems to allow for the abolition of democracy by democratic means. To counter this threat, some democratic political systems employ a practice of militant democracy, which restricts the rights of political participation and limits the freedom of association of those who aim to subvert democracy by democratic means. But militant democracy is open to the objection that democratic militancy is itself a violation of the democratic principle of political equality. Some authors, for example Hans Kelsen, therefore argue that a democracy can maintain its legitimacy only if it refuses to be militant, even if this carries the risk of the democratic abolition of democracy. This paper aims to show – with critical reference to Carl Schmitt’s conception of constitutional guardianship – that democratic militancy, despite appearances, does not conflict with democratic equality. Our obligation to extend equal rights of political participation to others is contingent on a condition of reciprocity: individuals or groups have a duty to treat others as political equals only if those others are themselves willing to respect democratic equality. Without this condition, our respect for the political rights of others would be open to be abused for our own enslavement. Democratic militancy targeted at anti-democrats who reject the condition of reciprocity is justifiable by our interest in avoiding subjection to unjust domination and doesn’t violate anyone’s political rights.

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