Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure

Michael C. Jensen · William H. Meckling

87 citations0/0 files stored

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Corporate Finance and Governance Economic Theory and Institutions Corporate Governance and Law

Abstract

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction and Summary The Agency Costs of Outside Equity Some Unanswered Questions Regarding the Existence of the Corporate Form The Agency Costs of D...

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 87 citations exist upstream.

References

1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization 1932The Modern Corporation and Private Property 1967Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics

Cited by

2020Board attributes, CSR engagement, and corporate performance: What is the nexus in the energy sector?2015Investment and financing for SMEs with a partial guarantee and jump risk 2023CEO attributes, board independence, and real earnings management: Evidence from Nigeria 2006Why Do Firms Cross-(De)List? An Examination of the Determinants and Effects of Cross-Delisting 2016Minority Rules: Credible State Ownership and Investment Risk Around the World 2022The audit committee as moderating the effect of hexagon’s fraud on fraudulent financial statements in mining companies listed on the Indonesia stock exchange 2014Liftoff: when strong growth is predicted by angels and fuelled by professional venture funds 2014Auditor-provided non-audit services in listed and private family firms

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.