Why Rational People Polarize

Kevin Matthew Dorst

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Social and Intergroup Psychology

Abstract

I argue that several of the psychological tendencies that drive polarization could arise from purely rational mechanisms, due to the fact that some types of evidence are predictably more ambiguous than others.

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References

1975Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 2018The spread of true and false news online 1998Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises 1979Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence.2018The science of fake news 1976The group polarization phenomenon.1986Group polarization: A critical review and meta-analysis.2017#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media

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2021Prejudice 2022From Belief Polarization to Echo Chambers: A Rationalizing Account

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