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Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
16 references·0 citing·28 second hopsampled
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References

  • 2003School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach1,572 cited
  • 1992Will Affirmative Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes838 cited
  • 2005Matching with Contracts802 cited
  • n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
  • 2005The New York City High School Match655 cited
  • 1999A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement567 cited
  • 2005The Boston Public School Match531 cited
  • 2009Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match500 cited
  • 2009Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets362 cited
  • 2008Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism346 cited
  • 2014The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects at Boston and New York Exam Schools338 cited
  • 2013School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation313 cited
  • 2016A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets312 cited
  • 2011School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds283 cited
  • 2013Effective affirmative action in school choice

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280 cited
  • 2009Affirmative action in education: Evidence from engineering college admissions in India279 cited
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