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Principal–principal agency conflicts, product market competition and corporate payout policy in China
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Principal–principal agency conflicts, product market competition and corporate payout policy in China (2020)Principal–principal agency conflicts, pro…Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective (2014)Corporate governance in China…Product Market Threats, Payouts, and Financial Flexibility (2012)Product Market Threats, Payou…Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries? (2009)Does corporate governance mat…Dividends and Expropriation (2001)Dividends and ExpropriationAgency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1999)Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow…The Efficiency Cost of Market Power in the Banking Industry: A Test of the “Quiet Life” and Related Hypotheses (1998)The Efficiency Cost of Market…Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World (1998)Agency Problems and Dividend …Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition (1997)Managerial Incentives and Pro…A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)A Survey of Corporate Governa…Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flo…A Theory of Yardstick Competition (1985)A Theory of Yardstick Competi…The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme (1983)The Market Mechanism as an In…Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition (1983)Prizes and Incentives: Toward…Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition (1983)Prices and Incentives: Toward…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsThe Dividend Puzzle (1976)The Dividend PuzzleRank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1979)Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations (1986)Economic Perspectives on Privatization (1991)Firm Innovation in Emerging Markets: The Role of Finance, Governance, and Competition (2011)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1991)Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1997)Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship* (2005)Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship (2008)Competition and innovation: an inverted U relationship (2017)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition (1992)Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition (1992)The Architecture of Government (2007)Law and Finance (1998)Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation (2002)The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins (2008)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)GROWTH, BETA AND AGENCY COSTS AS DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS (1982)Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends (1984)Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)Management entrenchment (1989)Stock market driven acquisitions (2003)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Noise (1986)Financial flexibility and the choice between dividends and stock repurchases (2000)A Catering Theory of Dividends (2004)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints? (1997)Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 (2003)How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? (2005)Politically Connected Firms (2006)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1986Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers17,216 cited
  • 1997A Survey of Corporate Governance16,237 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1998Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World3,179 cited
  • 1999Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers1,853 cited
  • 2001Dividends and Expropriation1,791 cited
  • 1983The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme1,504 cited
  • 1985A Theory of Yardstick Competition1,414 cited
  • 1976The Dividend Puzzle1,235 cited
  • 1997Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition1,178 cited
  • 2012Product Market Threats, Payouts, and Financial Flexibility1,152 cited
  • 1983Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition1,111 cited
  • 2009Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?1,042 cited
  • 1983Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition975 cited
  • 2014Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective937 cited
  • 1998The Efficiency Cost of Market Power in the Banking Industry: A Test of the “Quiet Life” and Related Hypotheses

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