The Illusion Of Control

Abstract

This chapter considers the proposed explanation’s implications for theory and research on human concepts of luck, as specified by the modal account of luck. It examines beliefs indicative of an illusion of control are constrained, not only by the same theories of mind and mechanics that humans apply in everyday functioning, but also by theories of randomness and supernatural forces. The set of hypotheses based on the problem-solving explanation of the illusion of control concern luck specifically in games of chance. The proposed explanation of the illusion of control posits that strategies in games of chance and concepts of luck even outside of games of chance are constrained by standard theories of the natural world and two additional general belief structures. The first is the gambler’s fallacy that random-outcome generators do not produce long streaks of neat patterns, and the second is a belief in justice-enforcing supernatural forces responsive to rituals.

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