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Design of Lotteries and Wait-Lists for Affordable Housing Allocation
13 references·1 citing·49 second hop
Design of Lotteries and Wait-Lists for Affordable Housing Allocation (2020)Design of Lotteries and Wait-Lists for Af…Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs (2017)Who Is Screened Out? Applicat…Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia (2016)Self-Targeting: Evidence from…On the Dynamic Control of Matching Queues (2014)On the Dynamic Control of Mat…What money canʼt buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals (2012)What money canʼt buy: Efficie…Optimal allocation without transfer payments (2012)Optimal allocation without tr…Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2011)Matching, Allocation, and Exc…The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals (2008)The Theory of Assortative Mat…Optimal mechanism design and money burning (2008)Optimal mechanism design and …Recipient Choice Can Address the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off in Kidney Transplantation: A Mechanism Design Model (2006)Recipient Choice Can Address …Pareto’s Law of Income Distribution: Evidence for Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States (2005)Pareto’s Law of Income Distri…The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control (2003)The Misallocation of Housing …Chapter 16 Two-sided matching (1992)Chapter 16 Two-sided matchingA PUBLIC HOUSING QUEUE WITH RENEGING (1988)A PUBLIC HOUSING QUEUE WITH R…Best to Be Last: Serial Position Effects in Legal Decisions in the Field and in the Lab (2019)Best to Be Last: Serial Posit…Scaling behaviour in the growth of companies (1996)Evidence for the exponential distribution of income in the USA (2001)Exponential and power-law probability distributions of wealth and income in the United Kingdom and the United States (2001)Do wealth distributions follow power laws? Evidence from ‘rich lists’ (2014)The Empirical Reality of IT Project Cost Overruns: Discovering A Power-Law Distribution (2022)The Social Costs of Sovereign Default (2022)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Job Market Signaling (1973)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources (2013)Optimal Allocation Without Money: An Engineering Approach (2014)A Theory of Justice (1971)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Incentives in Teams (1973)A NEW LOOK AT ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION MODELS AND DOUBLE MATCHING QUEUES (2011)An efficient method for kidney allocation problem: a credibility-based fuzzy common weights data envelopment analysis approach (2017)A multi-stage stochastic programming approach to epidemic resource allocation with equity considerations (2021)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets (2003)JOB MARKET SIGNALING OF RELATIVE POSITION, OR BECKER MARRIED TO SPENCE (2011)Stable Matching With Incomplete Information (2014)Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics (2017)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)An analysis of the German university admissions system (2012)School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action (2012)Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Revenue maximization with a single sample (2010)Selling privacy at auction (2013)Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification (2014)An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma (1983)Targeting the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia (2012)The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year* (2012)The Economist as Plumber (2017)Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs (2018)Social protection response to the COVID-19 crisis: options for developing countries (2020)A Treatise on the Family (1991)Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets (2016)How Do Resource Structuring and Strategic Flexibility Interact to Shape Radical Innovation? (2017)Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects (2021)Continuous Martingales and Brownian Motion (1999)Heavy traffic resource pooling in parallel‐server systems (1999)Scheduling Flexible Servers with Convex Delay Costs: Heavy-Traffic Optimality of the Generalized cμ-Rule (2004)Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers (2019)Optimal dynamic matching (2020)Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms (2021)Out of control: What can we learn from the end of Massachusetts rent control? (2006)Housing Liquidity, Mobility, and the Labour Market (2012)Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from the End of Rent Control in Cambridge, Massachusetts (2014)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2003The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control357 cited
  • 1992Chapter 16 Two-sided matching218 cited
  • 2016Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia211 cited
  • 2008Optimal mechanism design and money burning194 cited
  • 2011Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources190 cited
  • 2008The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals181 cited
  • 2006Recipient Choice Can Address the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off in Kidney Transplantation: A Mechanism Design Model149 cited
  • 2014On the Dynamic Control of Matching Queues136 cited
  • 2005Pareto’s Law of Income Distribution: Evidence for Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States109 cited
  • 2012What money canʼt buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals55 cited
  • 2012Optimal allocation without transfer payments51 cited
  • 1988A PUBLIC HOUSING QUEUE WITH RENEGING35 cited
  • 2017Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs26 cited

Cited by

  • 2019Best to Be Last: Serial Position Effects in Legal Decisions in the Field and in the Lab0 cited

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