Exceptionality and Colonial-State–Corporate Crimes in the Puerto Rican Fiscal and Economic Crisis

Abstract

A sociolegal analysis of the sources of Puerto Rico’s fiscal and economic crisis points to the use of the colonial state of exception as an economic development policy facilitating the creation of a tax-haven-like economy and normalizing a series of a colonial-state–corporate crimes. The Puerto Rican people need to hold those who generated the crisis accountable both politically and legally. They must continue mobilizing and promoting the repoliticization of recovery efforts by not paying the public debt, taking legal action against financial predators and corrupt politicians, clawing back fees and refusing to pay any additional fees, giving more importance to the human rights of Puerto Ricans than to the rights of bondholders and vulture funds, and initiating a process of decolonization that will allow them to make decisions about their future. Un análisis sociolegal de los orígenes de la crisis fiscal y económica de Puerto Rico apunta al uso del estado de excepción colonial como una política de desarrollo económico que facilita la creación de una economía parecida a un paraíso fiscal y normaliza una serie de crímenes estado-coloniales y corporativos. El pueblo puertorriqueño debe responsabilizar a quienes generaron la crisis, tanto política como legalmente. Deben continuar movilizando y promoviendo la repolitización de los esfuerzos de reactivación al no pagar la deuda pública, emprender acciones legales contra depredadores financieros y políticos corruptos, recuperar tarifas y negarse a pagar tarifas adicionales, dando más importancia a los derechos humanos de los puertorriqueños que a los derechos de los portadores de bonos y fondos buitres, e iniciar un proceso de descolonización que les permita tomar decisiones sobre su futuro.

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