Aristotle on Self-Knowledge

Abstract

Abstract This chapter argues that Aristotelian virtue of character involves knowledge of one’s own abilities and qualities, forms of self-knowledge that are implicit in Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean and in his account of practical reasoning. Support is found in the description of truthful people in EN IV 7, who, in contrast to boasters, give true, unexaggerated reports of their own qualities. It is also found in Aristotle’s discussion of the magnanimous person, who has knowledge of their own worth. The good person, then, has both kinds of knowledge, while the bad person may have knowledge about his non-ethical abilities, but not about his character. It is unclear whether the akratic, the person who knows the better course but voluntarily takes the worse, lacks self-knowledge or is self-deceived. Self-knowledge about one’s own character also appears in some of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship.

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