Investment in human capital

Abstract

At the end of this chapter, readers should be aware that: There are numerous types of incentive that may be utilised, depending on the nature of the work environment; Incentives will not be effective under all circumstances; Performance will vary over the course of the working day; The principal–agent problem is linked to problems of asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard; Whether to use time rates or piece rates depends partly on the size of monitoring costs; The success of rank order tournaments depends on the strength of incentives to finish first or earn promotion; Profit-sharing schemes and labour-managed firms are based on group rather than individual incentives.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 71 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.