The Concept of Disorder Revisited: Robustly Value-Laden Despite Change

Rachel Cooper

44 citations0/0 files storedAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

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Mental Health and Psychiatry Philosophical Ethics and Theory Medicine, History, and Philosophy

Abstract

Abstract Our concept of disorder is changing. This causes problems for projects of descriptive conceptual analysis. Conceptual change means that a criterion that was necessary for a condition to be a disorder at one time may cease to be necessary a relatively short time later. Nevertheless, some conceptually based claims will be fairly robust. In particular, the claim that no adequate account of disorder can appeal only to biological facts can be maintained for the foreseeable future. This is because our current concept of disorder continues to be laden with ethical and political values in multiple ways.

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2013Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 2000Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?1992The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between biological facts and social values.2004The social model of disability: An outdated ideology?2011Misfits: A Feminist Materialist Disability Concept 2018Fixing Language 2013The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry 1982Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of Diagnosis.

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