A Dynamic Game Theory Model For Tourism Supply Chains

Abstract

This article contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of tourism supply chains. We start with a baseline model including three types of agents: (a) one theme park, (b) multiple accommodation providers, and (c) multiple tour operators. We investigate the strategic dynamics (i.e., collaboration and competition) embedded in a market with two different tourism supply chains, and then we extend our model to an infinite-horizon repeated game arguing that agents would face the same decision problem in each week of every holiday season in each year. We show how agents in a tourism supply chain end up with higher profits in any given period of a repeated game compared with their profits in the static version of the game.

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