On publication, refereeing and working hard

Abstract

Abstract We present a model for academia with heterogeneous author types and endogenous effort to evaluate recent changes in the publication process in economics. We analyze the implications of these developments on research output. Lowering the precision of refereeing signals lowers the effort choices of intermediate ability authors, but invites more submissions from less able authors. Increasing the number of journals stimulates less able authors to submit their papers. The editor can improve the journal's quality pool of submitted manuscripts by improving the precision of refereeing, but not by lowering acceptance standards. The submission strategy of an author is informative of his ability.

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