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The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value
16 references·1 citing·35 second hop
The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value (2020)The explanatory objection to the fitting …The Philosophical Quarterly (2019)The Philosophical QuarterlyFittingness (2018)FittingnessThe right and the wrong kind of reasons (2017)The right and the wrong kind …Fittingness First (2016)Fittingness FirstTransmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason (2012)Transmission and the Wrong Ki…On What Matters (2011)On What MattersOn What Matters (2011)On What MattersNo Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails (2009)No Good Fit: Why the Fitting …Brentano and the Buck-Passers (2007)Brentano and the Buck-PassersThe Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value (2004)The Strike of the Demon: On F…Ethics Without Principles (2004)Ethics Without PrinciplesBuck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons (2004)Buck-Passing and the Wrong Ki…What We Owe to Each Other (2000)What We Owe to Each OtherThe Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions (2000)The Moralistic Fallacy: On th…Should we pass the buck? (2000)Should we pass the buck?The Definition of Good (1947)The Definition of GoodExplaining value: on Orsi and Garcia’s explanatory objection to the fitting-attitude analysis (2020)Explaining value: on Orsi and…A theory of justice original editionMinnesota studies in the philosophy of science (1956)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (2009)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)What is inference? (2012)The Language of Morals (1963)Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)The impossibility of moral responsibility (1994)Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare (2011)The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents (2012)The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism (2014)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)Value in ethics and economics (1994)Epistemic Partiality in Friendship (2006)The Nature of Normativity (2007)Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning (2015)Dispositional Theories of Value (1989)How We Get Along (2009)Slurring Words1 (2011)Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture (1994)Normative Requirements (1999)Internal and External Reasons (2008)What is Reasoning? (2017)The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons (2012)Reasons First (2021)Moral Uncertainty (2020)Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy (2001)A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value (2005)Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020)The Method of the Tractatus (2002)A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy (2013)How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal (2014)In dubious battle: uncertainty and the ethics of killing (2017)The experience requirement on well-being (2020)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2000What We Owe to Each Other3,491 cited
  • 2004Ethics Without Principles1,673 cited
  • 2000The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions1,071 cited
  • 2011On What Matters769 cited
  • 2004The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value721 cited
  • 2019The Philosophical Quarterly360 cited
  • 2011On What Matters343 cited
  • 2012Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason274 cited
  • 2007Brentano and the Buck-Passers223 cited
  • 2016Fittingness First211 cited
  • 2004Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons173 cited
  • 2009No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails170 cited
  • 2018Fittingness157 cited
  • 2017The right and the wrong kind of reasons137 cited
  • 2000Should we pass the buck?118 cited
  • 1947The Definition of Good112 cited

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  • 2020Explaining value: on Orsi and Garcia’s explanatory objection to the fitting-attitude analysis

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22 cited