Respect for Persons

Abstract

Modern ethical studies, when they are not theologically motivated, tend to neglect the elements in the western moral outlook which are characteristic of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.This volume is a welcome exception.Its authors announce it, in a sub-title, as 'a philosophical analysis of the moral, political and religious idea of the supreme worth of the individual person'.But it is much more than this.It presents the idea of respect for persons both as an attitude, including modes of feeling and thinking, which is both logically and morally basic; and also as the basic moral principle, so that all other moral principles are ways or modes of respecting persons.As a result, the authors are committed to expounding and defending what they themselves refer to as a 'respect for persons morality'.The first section of the book is concerned to clarify the concept of respect as exercised towards persons.What is it, we must ask, that provides the ground for respecting persons, and so for valuing or esteeming them as ends in themselves?The answer adopted derives from Kant.It is the possession of a rational will.On analysis, this is seen to involve two related capacities.The first is the ability to be self-determining, the second, the ability to govern one's conduct by rules.But this rationality must not be interpreted, as Kant seems to do, in the narrow sense that excludes emotions, feelings and desires.Sentience as characteristic of a person involves reason.This valuable insight leads to an important conclusion, which can best be expressed in a quotation.'The exercise of a rational will is to be seen as something at once ... cognitive, conative and affective, and it is the ability to exercise such a will in self-determination and rule-following which gives human personality its intrinsic value.'If self-determination and rule-following, then, are the grounds for respecting persons, what does 'respect' mean in this connection, and how does it show itself?It means that we esteem and value them as persons and that we cherish them so that their personal potentialities may flourish.It means that, so far as possible, we make their ends our own.It implies an active sympathy with them, which is a practical concern for them.If it is objected that every element in morality must be under the control of the will, and not everyone has been given a sympathetic nature, we can only answer that 'the creative and imaginative exercise of the moral life is not possible without active sympathy, and that the relevant form of sympathy is not so unevenly distributed that it cannot form the basis of the supreme attitude to morality'.This attitude of active sympathy seems, then, to be the proper expression of our recognition of persons as self-determining.Their capacity for rulefollowing, on the other hand, raises special difficulties.The rules which I follow may be different from theirs, in fact theirs may conflict with mine.I cannot then honestly make their ends my own.The authors reject what seems

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