The Politics of Privacy Theories: Moving from Norms to Vulnerabilities

Abstract

Privacy and surveillance are central features of public discourse around use of computing systems. As the systems we design and study are increasingly used and regulated as potential instruments of surveillance, HCI researchers-even those whose focus is not privacy-find themselves needing to understand privacy in their work. Concepts like contextual integrity and boundary regulation have become touchstones for thinking about privacy in HCI. In this paper, we draw on HCI and privacy literature to understand the limitations of commonly used theories and examine their assumptions, politics, strengths, and weaknesses. We use a case study from the HCI literature to illustrate conceptual gaps in existing frameworks where privacy requirements can fall through. Finally, we advocate vulnerability as a core concept for privacy theorizing and examine how feminist, queer-Marxist, and intersectional thinking may augment our existing repertoire of privacy theories to create a more inclusive scholarship and design practice.

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