Satisficing, meta-reasoning, and the rationality of further deliberation

Abstract

David Over has made seminal contributions to the study of human rationality, most memorably in the now-classic distinction, made in collaboration with Jonathan Evans, between normative and instrumental rationality. In this chapter, we discuss an under-explored aspect born of the tension between the two: the rationality of searching for further choice options. We review several candidates for a model of further deliberation, including classic Bayesian decision theory, bounded rationality, and the research domain concerned with the “secretary problem.” We demonstrate how none of these can satisfy the twin adequacy criteria calling for an account of processing as well as an account of rationality. We then present a model based on a proposal made in Douven ( 2002 ) and the psychological model of meta-reasoning. We conclude with implications for human rationality.

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