Discussions of “justice” in planning are commonplace; discussions of “kindness,” strangely enough, are rare. Perhaps not by accident. Taking “compassion” as an empathetic, intentional orientation toward suffering, we analyze “kindness” as the situated action of compassion that requires—following and extending analysis of Martha Nussbaum—four contingent, contextually sensitive practical judgments: (1) empathetic recognition of another’s vulnerability or suffering; (2) causal/moral gauging of the sources of that vulnerability or suffering; (3) crafting of acts to mitigate that vulnerability/suffering, and (4) forming the motivation to respond practically to that Other’s situation. Diverse planning cases from Cleveland, the Canadian Yukon, and Australia illuminate these practical judgments. We show how these contingent judgments can go wrong and thereby produce not kindness but humiliation, shame and victim blaming, pity and condescension, or dependency not autonomy. In doing so, the article makes a fresh contribution toward analyzing the moral requirements of, and the risks faced in, any planning seeking to respond to others’ vulnerabilities and suffering.
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