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Child support policies typically call for noncustodial fathers to provide their children financial support. However, setting orders too high may be counterproductive, resulting in lower payments and compliance and less regular payments. But how high is too high? Prior research is dated and inconsistent. We reexamine the relationship between the burden of orders and payments, compliance, and regularity. Using fixed-effects models and administrative data from Wisconsin, we find that payments increase until orders exceed 30 percent of earnings—that is, relatively high orders maximize the financial support children receive. However, compliance and regularity decline with higher burdens—the more that is expected, the less likely fathers are to meet expectations. Subgroup analyses show that payments do not increase with burden levels among low-income fathers. We discuss implications for current debates about how much child support should be expected from noncustodial fathers, particularly those with limited abilities to pay.
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