Uncertainties, Values, and Climate Targets

Mathias Frisch

13 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy of Science

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Philosophy and History of Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Climate Change Communication and Perception

Abstract

Using climate policy debates as a case study, I argue that a certain response to the argument from inductive risk, the hedging defense, runs afoul of a reasonable ethical principle: the no-passing-the-buck principle according to which scientists ought to offer their scientific judgment when such judgment is both possible and needed in public policy debates.

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2009Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal 2001Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming 2000Inductive Risk and Values in Science 2002Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change. Part 1: Benchmark Estimates 1953The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments 2013The Structure of Economic Modeling of the Potential Impacts of Climate Change: Grafting Gross Underestimation of Risk onto Already Narrow Science Models 2006A Core Precautionary Principle*2016Why the right climate target was agreed in Paris

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