SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality*
15 references·1 citing·44 second hop
The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality* (2020)The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rational…Can Pragmatists Be Moderate? (2020)Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs (2019)Radical moral encroachment: T…When Beliefs Wrong (2018)When Beliefs WrongEqual treatment for belief (2018)Equal treatment for beliefUniqueness and Metaepistemology (2016)Uniqueness and Metaepistemolo…An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support (2016)An Argument for Uniqueness Ab…The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence (2015)The Conflict of Evidence and …No Exception for Belief (2015)No Exception for BeliefEvidence and Agency (2015)Evidence and AgencyReverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations* (2012)Reverse Engineering Epistemic…Epistemic Partiality in Friendship (2006)Epistemic Partiality in Frien…Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification (2002)Evidence, Pragmatics, and Jus…The Ethics of Belief (2000)The Ethics of BeliefTHE NATURE OF RATIONALITY (1993)THE NATURE OF RATIONALITYThe Will to Believe, and other Essays in Popular Philosophy. (1897)The Will to Believe, and othe…Eliminating epistemic rationality # (2022)Eliminating epistemic rationa…Elusive knowledge (1996)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Believing for Practical Reasons (2018)Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics (2018)Real Talk on the Metaphysics of Gender (2018)The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)The Origin of Concepts (2000)Immoderately rational (2013)Epistemology and Cognition (1987)Rationality Through Reasoning (2013)Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch (2018)The Oxford Handbook of Assertion (2018)Reasons First (2021)PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH (1941)The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories (1976)Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection (1991)DOES MORAL IGNORANCE EXCULPATE? (2011)The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty (2015)The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments (1953)Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons (1999)On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology (2007)Belief, credence, and norms (2013)Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications (2014)Predictably irrational: the hidden forces that shape our decisions (2008)An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence (2016)Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters (2018)Conversational Pressure (2020)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)Knowledge in an Uncertain World (2009)Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal (2009)Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations (2019)Varieties of Moral Encroachment (2020)On statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness (2021)Individual differences in rational thought. (1998)Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (2004)Justification without Awareness (2006)Responsibility for believing (2006)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)Heuristics and Biases (2002)Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment (2002)The Affect Heuristic (2002)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1993THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY1,040 cited
  • 1897The Will to Believe, and other Essays in Popular Philosophy.809 cited
  • 2002Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification786 cited
  • 2000The Ethics of Belief506 cited
  • 2006Epistemic Partiality in Friendship458 cited
  • 2015The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence318 cited
  • 2019Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs237 cited
  • 2012Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations*195 cited
  • 2015No Exception for Belief187 cited
  • 2016Uniqueness and Metaepistemology166 cited
  • 2018Equal treatment for belief154 cited
  • 2015Evidence and Agency147 cited
  • 2018When Beliefs Wrong122 cited
  • 2016An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support110 cited
  • 2020Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?77 cited

Cited by

  • 2022Eliminating epistemic rationality #22 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work