Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology

Abstract

A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief’ template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge , is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgemental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity, to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p ) by alethically affirming that p . An advantage of the proposal developed is that it is shown to be compatible with competing views—viz., joint acceptance accounts and social-distributive accounts—of how group members must interact in order to materially realise a group belief. I conclude by showing how the proposed judgement-focussed collective (telic) virtue epistemology has important advantages over a rival version of collective virtue epistemology defended in recent work by Jesper Kallestrup.

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